原标题：巴菲特2023年致股东的信（中英文对照点评版）

全球投融圈【超级投行CEO大本营】

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致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc：

我和我的长期合伙人查理·芒格的工作是管理众多股东的储蓄。我和查理都非常感谢大家长久以来的信任，这种信任关系贯穿了一生中的大部分的时间。在我写这封信的时候，我想到的都是这些股东们。

Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.

一种普遍的信仰是，为了在退休后保持自己的生活水平，人们在年轻的时候会尽可能地多进行 储蓄。这个信仰背后的依据，是认为人们的遗产大部分情况下都会留给自己的家人，或者小部分可能会留给朋友或者支持慈善事业。

A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.

我和查理的经验不同。我们认为，伯克希尔的个人股东大多是那种一旦储蓄就会变着花样一直储蓄的类型。虽然这些人生活优渥，但最终他们会把大部分资金捐给慈善组织。这些慈善组织再通过各种慈善活动，来改善许多需要帮助的人的生活，尽管这些人大部分都跟原始捐助者毫不相干。这样做，日积月累之后往往会产生惊人的效果。

Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.

对于金钱不同的处理方式揭示了人的真面目。查理和我很高兴看到伯克希尔产生的资金大量流向满足 公共事业的需求，同时我们的股东很少选择炫富和大兴土木。

谁不喜欢为像这样的股东工作呢？

The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building。

Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours?

我们的业务

What we do

查理和我在伯克希尔公司 配置大家的储蓄资金，主要投资于两种高度相关的股权类型。首先，我们投资于 可以控股的公司，这一类我们通常选择100%的收购。伯克希尔公司指导这些公司如何进行资源配置并帮助他们选出适合的CEO，在管理大型企业时， 信任和规则都是必不可少的。伯克希尔公司非常强调前者，有些人会认为已经到了非常极端的程度。我们对业务错误有更高的容忍度；我们对个人不当行为的容忍度为零。

Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.

我们的第二类投资方式是 通过购买公开交易的股票持有企业的一部分。持有这些投资，我们在管理上没有发言权。但是我们的目标是，在拥有长期有利的经济特征和值得信任的管理者的企业中进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有公开交易的股票是基于我们对它们长期业务表现向好的判断，并不是因为我们把它们看作是短期买卖的工具。这一点非常重要：查理和我不是选股专家，我们是 选企业的专家。

In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management. Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

点评：这两个投资原则是巴菲特股东信的老生常谈的，其实就是两种投资方式，要不然100%控股，能够指导业务发展和人员配置等深度参与公司治理，要不然就是投资公开交易的好公司，且利用好公司、低估值的时机来完成投资交易。

多年来，我犯过许多错误。因此，我们目前的投资组合中包括一些具有真正非凡经济效益的企业，许多企业具有非常好的经济特征，以及一个庞大的边缘群体。在这个过程中，我投资的一部分企业已经倒闭了，它们的产品不受公众欢迎。资本主义有两面性：这一体系创造了越来越多的输家，但同时提供了大量改善的商品和服务。熊彼特称这种现象为 “创造性破坏”。

Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”

我们的公开交易市场的一个优势是——偶尔——可以很容易地以极好的价格买进一些优秀企业的一部分。所以要明白，股票交易的价格往往非常离谱，有可能是高得离谱，也有可能是低得离谱。 “有效”市场只存在于教科书中。事实上，市场上的股票和债券价格常常令人困惑，投资者的行为通常只有在时过境迁之后才能理解。

One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy piecesof wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.

受控企业是另一种情况。它们的价格有时高得离谱，但几乎从来没有便宜的估值。除非受到胁迫，否则 控股企业的所有者不会考虑以恐慌性估值出售。

Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation．

点评：这段话读起来很有意思，被控股的企业不会低估值进行交易，因为大股东都很聪明，绝对不会进行恐慌性的抛售，换在二级市场也同样如此，大股东是最能判断企业长期价值的人。

现在来看，我的成绩单是合格的：在我58年的伯克希尔经营中，我大部分的投资决策都不算太好。在某些情况下，我的一些错误决策也被大量的好运气所拯救(还记得我们是如何从美国航空（USAir）和所罗门公司(Salomon)免于灾难的吗？我确实做到了)。

At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)

我们令人满意的业绩来自于十几个真正正确的决策——大约每五年一个——以及一个有时被人淡忘的优势，这个优势有利于伯克希尔这样的长期投资者。让我们看一看幕后。

Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.

秘密武器

The Secret Sauce

1994年8月-是的，1994年。伯克希尔先后花了7年时间完成对我们现在持有的 4亿股可口可乐的收购，总成本为 13亿美元。这在当时对伯克希尔来说是一笔非常大的数目。

In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was $1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.

1994年我们从可口可乐公司获得的现金分红是7500万美元。到2022年，股息增加到7.04亿美元。每年都在成长，就像生日一样确定无疑。查理和我只需要兑现 可口可乐的季度股息支票，而且我们预计分红很可能会继续增加。

The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was $75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to $704million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.

美国运通（American Express）的情况大致相同。伯克希尔对美国运通的收购基本上是在1995年完成的，巧合的是，它也耗资 13亿美元。这项投资的年度股息从4100万美元增加到3.02亿美元。这些股息额未来极有可能会继续增加。

American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost $1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from $41 million to $302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.

这些股息收益虽然令人满意，但远非令人叹为观止。可是它们也带来了股价的极大增值。截至年底，我们的可口可乐投资价值为 250亿美元，而美国运通的投资价值为 220亿美元。现在，这两个持股分别约占伯克希尔净资产的5%，与很久以前的权重相当。

These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At year end, our Coke investment was valued at $25 billion while Amex was recorded at $22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.

假设一下：如果我在1990年代犯了一个类似规模的投资错误，这个错误导致投资价值持平、并在2022年简单维持在13亿美元价值的错误。（这方面的一个例子是买了 30年期长期债券。）那么这项令人失望的投资，现在只占伯克希尔净资产的0.3%，并将为我们每年固定提供8000万美元左右的年收入。

Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its $1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged $80 million or so of annual income.

给投资者的教训是：望庭前花开花落，起起伏伏。随着时间的推移，只需要几个正确的决策就能创造奇迹。而且，是的，早点开始，并活到90多岁也是很有帮助的。

The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom. Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.

点评：这段写得很有意思，相当于再此强调，长期投资（活得足够长，90多岁了，60多年的投资实战经历）、集中投资（可口可乐、美国运通等几个典型案例）。

过去一年小结

The Past Year in Brief

伯克希尔在2022年表现不错。公司的营业利润——我们使用通用会计原则（“GAAP”）计算，不包括持有股权的资本利得或损失——达到了创纪录的308亿美元。查理和我专注于这个运营数据，希望你们也能这么做。如果没有我们的调整，GAAP数据在每个报告日都会剧烈而反复无常地波动。请注意它在2022年那杂耍一般的表现，这绝不罕见：

Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual.

当按季度甚至按照年度业绩查看时，GAAP收益100%具有误导性。可以肯定的是，在过去的几十年里， 资本收益对伯克希尔来说非常重要，而且我们预计，它们在未来几十年将产生有意义的积极价值。但是，它们的季度波动经常被媒体盲目地报道，误导了投资者。

The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.

伯克希尔在过去一年的第二项积极进展是收购了 Alleghany保险，这是一家由 乔·布兰登（Joe Brandon）领导的财产-意外保险公司。我之前与乔共事过，他对伯克希尔和保险业都有独到见解。Allegany为我们带来了独特的价值，因为伯克希尔雄厚的财力能让 保险子公司追求持久且有价值的投资战略，这是几乎所有竞争对手都无法企及的。

A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.

在 Alleghany的帮助下，我们的保险浮存金在2022年从1470亿美元增加到1640亿美元。借助严格的核保，这些资金有很大机会随着时间的推移变成无成本资金。自1967年收购我们的第一家财产-意外保险公司以来，伯克希尔已经通过收购、运营和创新将浮存金增加了 8000倍。尽管没有在我们的财报中确认，但这些 浮存金对伯克希尔来说是一笔非凡的资产。新股东可以通过阅读我们每年更新的A-2页上的浮动说明来了解其价值。

Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-freeover time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.

2022年，通过伯克希尔的股票回购以及苹果和美国运通的类似操作（这两家公司都是我们的重要投资对象），每股内在价值实现了小幅度增长。在伯克希尔，我们通过回购1.2%的公司流通股，直接增加了您持有的我们独特业务组合的收益。而对苹果和美国运通的股票回购，也在没有增加我们任何成本的情况下，增加了伯克希尔的持股比例。

A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.

计算过程并不复杂： 当股本数量减少时，您持有的许多企业的权益都会增加。如果回购以增值价格实施，每增加一点都有帮助。同样可以确定的是，当一家公司为回购支付过高价格时，继续持有的股东会遭受损失。在这种情况下，获益的只有卖出股票的股东，以及热情推荐这种愚蠢回购但却收费高昂的投资银行家。

The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, yourinterest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.

需要强调的是，通过增值回购获得的收益可以惠及所有股东——在所有方面都是如此。如果您愿意，可以思考下面的例子：一家当地汽车经销商有三个完全知情的股东，其中一个负责管理企业。如果其中一个被动股东希望将他的权益卖回给公司，而且价格对另外两位继续持有的股东有吸引力。当交易完成时，这笔交易是否会损害任何人的利益？这位管理者是否受到优待，而继续持有的被动所有者却不受优待？公众是否受到了伤害？

Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?

如果有人告诉你，所有的回购行为都对股东或国家不利，或者对CEO特别有利，此人要么是经济文盲，要么是一个巧舌如簧的煽动家（这两个角色并不互斥）。

When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are notmutually exclusive).

伯克希尔2022年的运营细节事无巨细地列在K-33 —— K-66页上，查理和我，以及伯克希尔的许多股东，都喜欢研究这一部分列出的许多事实和数字。当然，这些并不是必读的。有许多伯克希尔的百万富豪，还有一些亿万富豪，他们从未研究过我们的财务数据。他们只是知道，查理和我——以及我们的家人和亲密的朋友——继续在伯克希尔有着非常重要的投资，他们相信： 我们会像对待自己的钱一样，对待他们的钱。

Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.

这也是我们可以做出的承诺。

And that is a promise we can make.

最后，还有一个重要的提醒：财务报表中的“运营利润”是我们非常关注的，但这些数字，很容易被经理们操纵。CEO、董事和他们的顾问通常也认为，这种篡改行为是高明的。而记者和分析师也接受它的存在。毕竟，打破“预期”被吹捧为管理上的一次胜利。

Finally, an important warning: Even the operatingearnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.

这种行为令人厌恶。操纵数字并不需要天赋：只需要一种深深的欺骗欲望。正如一位CEO曾经向我描述过他的欺骗行为那样，“大胆的想象性会计”已经成为资本主义的耻辱之一。

That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.

58年和几个数字

58 Years – and a Few Figures

1965年，伯克希尔还只是一匹“只懂一种戏法的小马”（即一项简单业务），拥有一家历史悠久、但注定要倒闭的新英格兰纺织品公司。随着这项业务濒临破产，伯克希尔需要立即有一个新的业务方向。回过头来看，我当时迟迟没有意识到问题的严重性。

In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.

但随后，好运降临： 国民保险（National Indemity）于1967年成立，我们将资源转向 保险和其他非纺织业务。

And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.

就这样，我们开始了通往2023年的旅程。这是一条坎坷的道路，其中包括 我们所有者不断的储蓄（即通过他们的留存收益）、复利的力量、避免重大错误，以及最重要的“美国顺风”（American Tailwind）。美国没有伯克希尔哈撒韦也能很好地发展。反之，则并非如此。

Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.

现在，伯克希尔拥有一系列巨大而多元化的企业。让我们先看看每天在纳斯达克、纽约证券交易所和相关交易场所交易的大约5000家上市公司。在这个群体中，有标准普尔500指数的成员。“标准普尔500指数”是一个由大型且知名的美国公司组成的集合。

Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.

总体而言，这500家上市公司在2021年赚了1.8万亿美元。目前我还没有2022年的最终数据,因此，使用2021年的数据，这500家公司中只有128家（包括伯克希尔）赚了30亿美元或更多，但是还有23家公司亏损。

In aggregate, the 500 earned $1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022.Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned $3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.

截至2022年底，伯克希尔是其中八家巨头的最大股东： 美国运通、美国银行、雪佛龙、可口可乐、惠普、穆迪、西方石油和派拉蒙全球。

At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eightof these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.

除这8家标的外，伯克希尔还持有 伯灵顿北圣太菲铁路运输公司（简称伯灵顿北）100%的股份和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源 92%的股份，每家的收益均超过上述的30亿美元（伯灵顿北为59亿美元，伯克希尔哈撒韦能源为43亿美元）。如果这两家公司公开上市，它们将被收录进那500家公司中。总的来说，我们的10家控股和非控股的巨头，使伯克希尔公司比任何其他美国公司都更广泛地与本国未来的经济保持一致。（这一计算不考虑养老基金和投资公司等“信托”业务。）此外， 伯克希尔的保险业务虽然通过许多单独管理的子公司进行，但其价值与伯灵顿北或伯克希尔哈撒韦能源相当。

In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the $3 billion mark noted above ($5.9 billion at BNSF and $4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500. All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.

未来，伯克希尔公司将始终持有大量现金和美国国债，以及一系列业务。我们还将避免任何会在关键时刻导致现金流不便的鲁莽行为，包括在金融恐慌和前所未有的保险损失。我们的CEO将永远是 首席风险官——尽管他（她）本不必承担这项责任。此外，我们未来的首席执行官们将有相当一部分的净资产收益是用自己的钱购买伯克希尔股票而获得的。是的，我们的股东将通过持续的获得收益来保证储蓄和繁荣。

As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.

在伯克希尔，一切永无止境。

At Berkshire, there will be no finish line.

一些关于联邦税的令人震惊的事实

Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes

在截至2021年的十年中，美国财政部的税收约为32.3万亿美元，而支出却达到43.9万亿美元。

During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about $32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent $43.9 trillion.

尽管经济学家、政治家和许多公众对这种财政失衡的有不同的看法，但查理和我，自认对此知之甚少，但我们坚信近期那些对经济和市场的预测简直毫无用处。我们的工作是以能够在长期内取得可接受结果的方式管理伯克希尔的运营和财务，并在金融恐慌或全球严重衰退发生时保持公司无与伦比的持久力。伯克希尔还提供了一些适度的保护，以防通胀失控，但这些保护远非完美，巨大的财政赤字是会带来后果的。

Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.

财政部通过个人所得税（48%）、社会保障和相关收入（34.5%）、企业所得税支付（8.5%）和各种较小的税目获得了32万亿美元的收入。在这十年中，伯克希尔公司通过企业所得税缴纳的税款为320亿美元，几乎是财政部所有收入的千分之一。

The $32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (341⁄2%), corporate income tax payments (81⁄2%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was $32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.

这意味着——请做好准备——如果美国有大约1000名纳税人的纳税额与伯克希尔的纳税额相当，那么就不需要其他企业或美国1.31亿家庭再向联邦政府缴纳任何税款了。一分钱也不需要。

And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.

数百万、数十亿、数万亿——我们都知道这些词，但其中涉及的金额几乎无法理解。让我们用物理维度来理解这些数字：

Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:

如果你把100万美元兑换成新印的100美元，你会有一堆能和你胸口等高的钞票。用10亿美元进行同样的操作——这越来越令人兴奋了！——会堆到大约3/4英里高的天空。最后，想象一下伯克希尔2012-21年度联邦所得税支付总额达到320亿美元。现在，这些钱堆叠的高度已经超过21英里，大约是商用飞机通常巡航高度的三倍。

If you convert $1 million into newly-printed $100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest. Perform the same exercise with $1 billion– this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about 3⁄4 of a mile into the sky. Finally, imagine piling up $32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.

当涉及到联邦税收时，伯克希尔的个人股东可以自豪地说“我已经给了”。

When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”

在伯克希尔，我们希望在未来十年缴纳更多的税款。我们对美国应该有更多回报：美国的活力对伯克希尔取得的任何成功都做出了巨大贡献——伯克希尔永远都需要这种贡献。我们依靠的是美国顺风，虽然它有时会停滞不前，但它的推动力总是会回来的。

At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.

我从事投资已经80年了——超过了美国历史的三分之一。尽管我们的公民有自我批评和自我怀疑的倾向——甚至可以说是狂热——但我还没有看到什么时候有理由长期做空美国，如果这封信的读者在将来会有不同的体验，对此我深表怀疑。

I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.

点评：为什么欧洲和亚洲都没诞生巴菲特，非洲就更不可能了，“没有人能依靠做空自己的祖国来成功”，出身在一个没有战乱、商业文明高度发达的国都才可能完成巴菲特这样的资本积累，这是宏观大环境！

没有什么比拥有一个好搭档更好的了

Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner

查理和我的想法很相似。我花了一页纸解释的东西，他会用一句话总结出来。而且，他的版本，逻辑总是更清晰，也会更巧妙地——有时可能会更直言不讳地进行陈述。

Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.

以下是他的一些想法，很多摘自最近的播客：

Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:

世界上到处都是 愚蠢的赌徒，他们远不如 有耐心的投资者。

The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.

如果你看不清世界的本来面目，便只能通过扭曲的镜头来判断。

If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.

我想知道我将死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里。还有一个相关的想法:尽早写下你想要的讣告——然后据此行事。

All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.

如果你不在乎自己是否理性，你就不会在这方面下功夫。然后你就会一直不理性，并得到最差的结果。

If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.

耐心是可以学习的。 拥有长时间的注意力，且能够长时间专注于一件事是一个巨大的优势。

Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.

你可以从死去的人身上学到很多东西。读那些你所钦佩和厌恶的死者的文章。

You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.

如果你能游到适合航海的船上，就不要乘坐正在下沉的船。

Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.

一家伟大的公司会在你离开后继续运作；一个平庸的公司则不会这样。

A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.

沃伦和我不关注市场的泡沫。我们寻找长期投资机会，并坚持长期持有。

Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.

本·格雷厄姆说过： “从短期看，股市都是一台投票机；从长远来看，它就是一台称重机。”如果你不断创造更有价值的东西，那么一些明智的人就会注意到它，并开始购买。

Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.

投资没有百分之百的把握。因此，使用 杠杆是危险的。一串奇妙的数字乘以0总是等于0,不要指望能富两次。

There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.

然而，你不需要拥有很多东西就能致富。

You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.

如果你想成为一个伟大的投资者，你必须不断学习。当世界发生变化时，你也必须改变。

You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.

沃伦和我讨厌铁路股有几十年了，但世界变了，美国终于有了四条对美国经济至关重要的大型铁路。我们迟迟没有意识到这种变化，但迟到总比不到好。

Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.

最后，我要补充查理的两句话，这两句话一直是他几十年来做决定的关键：“沃伦，再考虑一下。你很聪明，但我是对的。”

Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.

就这样。每次和查理通话，我都会有收获。而且，当他让我思考时，他也让我笑。

And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.

我将在查理的清单上加上一条我自己的规则： 找一个非常聪明的高级伙伴——最好比你稍微年长一点——然后认真听取他的意见。

I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen verycarefully to what he says.

奥马哈的家庭聚会

A Family Gathering in Omaha

查理和我真是有点无耻。去年，在我们三年来的第一次（线下）股东大会上，我们一如既往地以繁忙的商业活动来迎接大家。

Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.

开市铃一响，我们就直奔你们的钱包。在短时间内，我们的喜诗小摊卖给你们11吨营养花生糖和巧克力。在我们的P.T．巴纳姆（马戏之王）演讲中，我们向你们保证过吃它会长寿。毕竟，除了喜诗的糖果，还有什么能解释查理和我能活到99岁和92岁呢？

From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?

我知道你们迫不及待地想知道去年活动的细节。

I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle.

周五，从中午一直到下午5点，我们的糖果柜台共卖出了2690份。周六，在早上7点到下午4点30分之间，喜诗又登记了3931笔交易，尽管在9个半小时的营业时间中，有6个半小时，是我们的电影放映和问答环节，限制了商业客流。

On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 61⁄2 of the 91⁄2 operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.

算算看：喜诗在其黄金营业时间内，每分钟约有10笔销售（两天内销售额达400，309美元），101年以来，消费模式没有发生实质性改变。在福特T型车时代卖喜诗糖的方法，今天也管用。

Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up $400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.

查理，我和整个伯克希尔公司都期待着5月5-6日在奥马哈见到你。我们会玩得很开心，你也会玩得很开心。

Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.

2023年2月25日 沃伦·巴菲特

董事会主席

February 25, 2023 Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

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